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ABSTRACT
Examining the Social Affordances of Communication Technology on Human Relations:
A Critique of Networked Individualism from the Perspective of the
Ethical Phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas
Michael L. Wood
Department of Sociology, BYU
Master of Science
In this thesis, I ask how our understanding of human relations carries implications for the
way we understand the affordances of communication technology on human relations. To this
end, I examine and compare two opposed perspectives of human relations and social life. The
first perspective, networked individualism, is a version of network theory that begins with a
foundation of agentic individuals who actively construct and manage their social worlds.
Levinasian relationalism, the second perspective, offers a contrasting view that sees human
relations as constitutive of human subjectivity. In comparing these two perspectives, I argue that
networked individualism is an inadequate framework inasmuch as its ontological assertions
prevent it from seeing some of the significant affordances of technology on human relations, and
I suggest that Levinasian relationalism is a viable alternative.

Keywords: information and communication technologies (ICTs), human relations, social
networks, networked individualism, relational ontology, ethical phenomenology, Barry Wellman,
Emmanuel Levinas
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INTRODUCTION
There is little doubt that modern technology has had a significant impact on the social
world. Everyone living in North America of a certain age has witnessed the development of a
new way of life, characterized by widespread adoption of information and communication
technologies (ICTs). Computers and cell phones in particular have taken center stage, going from
curious novelties to necessary accessories. As of January 2014, 90% of American adults own a
cell phone, and 58% of cell phone owners have smart phones. 85% of American adults regularly
access the Internet, and 63% of American adults use a smart phone to go online (PewResearch
Internet Project 2014). The idea of the cyborg, once an odd image of science fiction, is now a
perceptive description of mundane life. In the words of Sherry Turkle (2012), “we are all cyborgs
now.”
Despite the tremendous scope of these changes, the question of what this all means for
human relations is still open for debate. Authors have presented a wide variety of conflicting
arguments regarding the possibilities of these devices for human life. While some authors have
heralded the arrival of personal freedom, virtual community and endless creative possibilities
(Bakardjieva 2003; Rheingold 2000; Shirky 2008), others fear increases in addiction (Young
1998) and isolation (Morahan-Martin and Schumacher 2003; Turkle 2012) and the rise of a
meaningless world filled with poorly-executed projects (Keen 2008). All these conflicting
accounts may make the search for a scientific understanding of the social impact of technology
appear hopeless, but if we take seriously the possibility that all of these conflicting accounts may
have some truth to them, we arrive at a key starting point in the technology debate: modern
devices create social affordances, but they do not cause any particular outcome (Hutchby 2001;
Wellman, Quan‐Haase, Boase, Chen, Hampton, Diaz, and Miyata 2003). As White (1964) says,
1

“As our understanding of the history of technology increases, it becomes clear that a new device
merely opens a door; it does not compel one to enter.” As attractive as simple deterministic
accounts may be, there is too much variability in technology use and social outcomes to take
them as adequate or complete.
Even though the social impact of technology resists deterministic explanations, we are
not left to merely assume that its influence is neutral or relativistic. As Melvin Kranzberg
famously said, “Technology is neither good nor bad; nor is it neutral.” When authors speak of the
affordances of technology, they refer to this middle position. According to Hutchby (2001)
“[A]ffordances are functional and relations aspects which frame, while not determining, the
possibilities for agentic action in relation to an object. In this way, technologies can be understood as
artefacts which may be both shaped by and shaping of the practices humans use in interaction with,
around and through them. This ‘third way’ between the (constructivist) emphasis on the shaping power of
human agency and the (realist) emphasis on the constraining power of technical capacities opens the way
for new analyses of how technological artefacts become important elements in the patterns of ordinary
human conduct” (p. 444).

In other words, understanding the impact of technology in terms of affordances
recognizes that humans are able to shape the meaning of technology, but also recognizes that the
number of possible “readings” or interpretations of a device is limited. Hutchby further clarifies
this point:
“Does the aeroplane lend itself to the same set of possible interpretations as the bridge; and
if not, why not? I suggest that the answer to this question is no. The reason is that different
technologies possess different affordances, and these affordances constrain the ways that they can
possibly be ‘written’ or ‘read’… The affordances of an artefact are not things which impose
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themselves upon humans’ actions with, around, or via that artefact. But they do set limits on what is
possible to do with, around, or via the artefact… technological artefacts do not amount simply to
what their users make of them; what is made of them is accomplished in the interface between
human aims and the artefact’s affordances” (pp. 447; 453).

An important assumption about affordances is that devices are in some way limited in
what they can “do.” An iPhone, for example, can be used to make phone calls, browse the web,
or can even be thrown as a weapon, but it cannot physically transport you from one place to
another (although it could help you plan a trip!). With so much talk about how ICTs shape human
relations and social life, an important alternative question arises: are there some things which
ICTs cannot do for human relations? Stated differently, are there some dimensions of human
social life which fall outside the affordances of contemporary devices? If so, it would be
important to know, because this would suggest that relying too extensively on ICTs to mediate
our relations would be inadequate in some way.
Taking up the question of the affordances of ICTs for human relations demands
consideration of what human relations are. When we talk about human relations, what do we
mean? In this thesis, I argue that this theoretical starting point—the question “what are human
relations”—is in many ways the question, inasmuch as our theoretical foundation shapes how we
perceive the impact of ICTs on human relations. In this way, the question of the affordances of
technology for human relations is similar to the debate over the affordances of modernization for
community. For those who understand community as sociality bound to a particular space,
modernization is a dangerous, atomizing force. On the other hand, for those who understand
community as affective relations that are not necessarily bound to a physical location,
modernization is seen as less of a threat.
3

To illustrate the importance of theoretical starting points in technology research, I
examine and compare two distinct perspectives of social life. The first perspective I examine is
called “Networked Individualism,” which is characterized by an egocentric agent who creates
and manages a social world that remains separate from his/her self. The second perspective I
consider is the relational phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, which presents a radically
different view of social life. By bringing these two perspectives into dialogue, I aim to show that
egocentric approaches of sociality such as networked individualism, while useful, miss some of
the most meaningful dimensions of social life. Thus, inasmuch as network individualists ignore
the limitations of their conclusions emerging from their theoretical beginnings, they risk
overlooking important dimensions of sociality and perpetuating a reductive view of human
existence that fails to capture the constraints and possibilities belonging to the affordances of
ICTs for human relations.
Roadmap
The thesis is divided into four main chapters. In the first chapter, I review the theory of
networked individualism and I examine how this theory carries implications for understanding
the affordances of ICTs on human relations. In the second chapter I apply Martin Heidegger’s
conception of enframing to argue that networked individualism presents a dangerously limited
view of the social world that is caught up in instrumental rationality. In the third chapter I present
the relational phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas as an alternative view which explores
dimensions of social experience that networked individualism does not seriously consider. I
argue that Levinas’s ethical relationalism is a good option for moving beyond the instrumental
limitations of networked individualism. In the fourth chapter, I compare and contrast the
implications of networked individualism and relational phenomenology for understanding the

4

impact of ICTs on human relations. Finally, I conclude with a brief summary of my arguments
and a consideration of the implications for policy-makers and future research.

5

CHAPTER 1: THE THEORY OF NETWORKED INDIVIDUALISM
In this chapter I examine the theory of “networked individualism.” Developed primarily
by the sociologist Barry Wellman, networked individualism borrows concepts from social
network analysis, social capital research, and theories of community transformation to explain
human relations in contemporary life. Barry Wellman is widely recognized for his work on
community (Wellman 1979; Wellman and Gulia 1999), the Internet (Wellman 2011; Wellman et
al. 2003), and personal networks (Wellman 2001; Wellman, Carrington, and Hall 1997), and is
the current director of NetLab at the University of Toronto. As a theory of technology and social
life, networked individualism is worth investigating for at least two reasons: First, network
individualism brings recent insights from technology scholarship to some of sociology’s most
persistent questions and provides a new way of understanding our highly-technological social
life. Second, networked individualism has gained significant traction in recent years and has
become a major theory for empirical research on technology, especially in research on virtual
communities and personal networks. In 2012, Wellman coauthored the book Networked: The
New Social Operating System, with Lee Rainie, the director of the Pew Research Center's
Internet & American Life Project. The book provides an outline of networked individualism and
makes extensive use of Pew Research data to support its claims. Networked individualism has
been used as a framework for understanding many different areas of social life, including
education (Jones 2012; Jones, Ferreday, and Hodgson 2008), urban planning (Foth and Adkins
2006; Foth and Hearn 2007), work (Rainie and Wellman 2012), civil society (Friedland, Hove,
and Rojas 2006), and family life (Kennedy and Wellman 2007). To avoid linguistically-awkward
descriptors I refer to authors who write about networked individualism as “NI theorists.” Readers
should be aware that although networked individualism is a subset of network theory, the claims
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of NI theorists do not necessarily represent the views of network theorists in general. Some of
these differences will become more apparent later on.
At its most basic level, networked individualism understands human relations as
interpersonal ties belonging to personal networks that are managed by an autonomous actor who
relies extensively on information and communication technologies (ICTs) (Boase and Wellman
2006; Chua, Madej, and Wellman 2011; Rainie and Wellman 2012; Wellman 2001). According to
NI theorists, this model of social life is a result of social changes that can be attributed to
technological developments and cultural shifts in the 20th century. To begin my examination of
networked individualism, I briefly review this historical account. As we will see, networked
individualism often presents itself as an alternative to typical “community lost” narratives.
Modernization and the Decline of Traditional Place-Based Community
For well over a hundred years, social scientists and historians have been observing and
recording the transformation of social life. Although their descriptions and interpretations vary
widely, most agree that there has been a decline of a particular kind of community, namely the
“traditional” or “pre-modern” community. Arguably the most famous depiction of the traditional
community was provided by 19th and 20th century sociologist Ferdinand Tonnies (2002), who
described the traditional community with the term Gemeinschaft, which he characterized as
“intimate, private, and exclusive living together.” Gemeinschaft was understood apart from
Gesellschaft, which Tonnies described as an “artificial construction of an aggregate of human
beings.” Rainie and Wellman (2012) elaborate on this description, describing traditional
communities as bounded groups. In traditional communities, they argue, people socialized in
densely-knit groups that were bound to a local area. Everyone within the community had the
same overlapping ties, and the group most often represented the entirety of one’s social world.
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Because of the solidarity and insularity of these groups, they also had strong social control and
could easily command loyalty of their members. An individual’s social world was thus
homogenous and bound to a single group in a single place.
The decline of traditional, bounded communities coincided with the rise of the “modern”
era, though different authors have emphasized different historical events in relation to this
change. Herlihy (1997), for example, traces the roots of this change to the Black Death in
Europe, which decimated the population and upset the social order, ushering an era of
individuality and existential questioning. Alternatively, other authors point to the development of
transportation and communication technologies, especially during the 19th and 20th centuries
(Putnam 2001; Rainie and Wellman 2012; Wellman 2002b). According to this latter view,
inventions such as the railroad, the telegraph, the telephone, the airplane, and eventually the
Internet all helped weaken traditional group boundaries free individuals from the social
constraints of bounded groups.
For many, the decline of traditional, bounded communities raised serious questions about
modern social life. Some social scientists feared that the decline of traditional communities
would create a society characterized by a mass of isolated individuals connected by little more
than economic interest. Tonnies (2002), for example, feared the displacement of Gemeinschaft by
the more impersonal Gesellschaft. Louis Wirth (1938), drawing on Tonnies, argued that the
warm, nurturing setting of traditional communities was being replaced by a cold and impersonal
“urbanism.” Without the bonds of strong solidary communities, many scholars feared that social
life would decline and degenerate to social isolation or “individualism,” a concept famously
hypothesized by Alexis De Tocqueville (1988). Empirical accounts of this individualism have
been provided in more recently by Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, and Tipton (2008), Putnam
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(2001) and McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Brashears (2006). Robert Putnam’s account of the
decline of participation in bowling leagues and the rise of “bowling alone” has been especially
influential among social scientists and community pundits alike.
Accounts of community decline and rising isolation and individualism have been
compounded in recent years by accounts of the isolating tendencies of ICTs. Specifically, authors
have argued that ICTs and the Internet make users lonelier and more depressed (Kraut, Patterson,
Lundmark, Kiesler, Mukophadhyay, and Scherlis 1998), displace involvement in real life thereby
creating loners and addicts (Nie and Erbring 2000), impoverish social interactions by reducing
face-to-face contact (Nie 2001), and contribute to becoming more “socially disengaged” (Sigman
2009) and living “alone together” (Turkle 2012). The recurring image here is of a mass of
“lonely individual[s], hunched over a computer or smartphone screen, avoiding… human
interaction” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 126), and is perhaps the most popular account of ICTs
in popular media today. In this way, recent technological developments are seen as accelerating
the trend toward increasingly higher levels of social isolation.
Boundless Communities
The pessimistic story of community decline has not gone without question. While
some authors have argued that the decline of placed-based community is fraught with
existential and moral danger, others suggest that the picture is not so stark. Bender (1982) for
example, argues that although place-based communities are no longer the dominant mode of
social organization, communities persist in less visible but equally meaningful and important
forms. Central to his thesis is the decoupling of community and place. He writes that
“community, which has taken many structural forms in the past, is best defined as a network
of social relations marked by mutuality and emotional bonds” (p. 7). This decoupling has

9

allowed scholars to see community in all kinds of places, ranging from entire nations
(Anderson 2006) to online communities (Rheingold 2000; Wellman and Gulia 1999) and
personal networks (Chua, Madej, and Wellman 2009; Chua, Madej, and Wellman 2011;
Wellman 2001; Wellman 2007). In sum, these authors argue that while there has indeed been
a significant change in the way that we relate to one another, community is not “lost,” because
community is defined conceptually by affective relations rather than spatial limitations and
face-to-face interactions.
Networked individualism takes this latter view, understanding community as
something that is not tied to any particular location. The transformation NI theorists describe
is not the shift from community to isolation, but rather, from bounded communities to
personal networks (Chua, Madej, and Wellman 2011; Licoppe and Smoreda 2005; Petrovčič
2008; Wellman 2007; Wellman, Boase, and Chen 2002). While NI theorists admit that there
has indeed been a “revolution,” they argue that “communities continue to exist, except as
spacially dispersed and differentiated personal networks rather than as neighborhoods or
densely knit groups” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 146). They argue that when thinking about
the question of community and human relations, “it helps to think about communities as fluid
personal networks, rather than as static neighborhood or family groups. For too long, the
model of community has been the preindustrial village where people walked door to door, and
all knew, supported, and surveilled one another. These bygone village groups have largely
transmuted into multiple, fragmented personal networks connected by the individuals and
households at their centers” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 122). NI theorists do not deny that
traditional forms of social organization such as families and bounded communities continue to
exist, but they argue that these groups are more of a heuristic than an adequate explanation of
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our social reality. They try to show that “people think they are in groups but they really are in
networks” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 34; Boase and Wellman, 2006). They affirm that
thinking as a group has certain benefits, such as creating a stable environment including
norms for mutual help, but they argue that “most people in developed countries do not operate
in tightly bounded, densely knit, group-centered worlds, and much of the less-developed
world also is networked. People have separate agendas and schedules in their homes,
communities, and at work. They socialize with shifting sets of friends rather than being
regulars at bars or bowling leagues; many work in multiple teams at work—and increasingly
away from the office… In short, people live in fluid and changing networks that go well
beyond groups” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 36).
One of the advantages of this alternative community narrative is that it allows us to
consider social change in a less deterministic and pessimistic view. NI theorists recognize that
place-based communities are no longer the main model of social organization, but unlike
pessimistic scholars of individualization who argue that the decline of place-based communities
brings about isolation and social malaise, they argue that networks can adequately provide for the
needs that were once taken-for-granted (and perhaps offer more). “The networked operating
system gives people new ways to solve problems and meet social needs. It offers more freedom
to individuals than people experienced in the past because now they have more room to
maneuver and more capacity to act on their own” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 9). In other
words, although modern, networked individuals no longer rely on traditional groups as the
foundation of social life, this does not mean that they lead isolated, hopeless lives. To use the oftcited example from Putnam, while it may be true that fewer people belong to bowling leagues,
Rainie and Wellman argue that rather than bowling alone, people belong to “shifting networks of
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friends who bowl” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 38).
This concept of personal communities and personal networks also allows NI theorists to
reconsider the question of ICTs and social isolation. Equipped with the latest numbers from the
Pew Research Center and their own collection of qualitative data, Rainie and Wellman (2012)
repeatedly argue that, contrary to more pessimistic authors, ICTs are more beneficial than
harmful for human relations. For example, they find that ICT users tend to have larger and more
diverse networks and they meet with the people in their networks more frequently. They also
note that ICT users tend to stay continually connected with their friends and family. These trends
lead Rainie and Wellman to claim that ICTs augment rather than replace human relations. In this
they are not alone—many other authors have reported similar findings, especially in relation to
social capital (Amichai-Hamburger and Hayat 2011; Calabrese, Smoreda, Blondel, and Ratti
2011; Katz and Rice 2002; Täube 2004; Tillema, Dijst, and Schwanen 2010; Wang and Law
2007).
Nevertheless, the concepts of “virtual communities” and “personal” networks have come
under attack over the years. Freie (1998), for example, argues that such communities are not
authentic communities but “counterfeit communities” because they are based purely on the
psychological needs of the members and demand no lasting commitment, and as such, fail to
provide lasting groups of relations. Dreyfus (2008) makes similar arguments. Drawing on
Kierkegaard’s critique of the public sphere, he argues that the lack of commitment in online
personal communities prevents them from generating the meaningfulness of a genuine agora or
community. In response to these criticisms, Bakardjieva (2003) suggests that social scientists
should leave behind the battle of “community” and consider the myriad of ways in which the
Internet improves people’s social lives. Similarly, for proponents of NI theorists, the question of
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“authentic community” is a misguided question. They argue that the real question is not whether
a person belongs to an “authentic community,” but whether a person’s model of social life
adequately meets his/her social needs (Boase and Wellman 2006; Rainie and Wellman 2012;
Wellman 2002a; Wellman, Boase, and Chen 2002).
To summarize, NI theorists argue that the current pattern of social life emerged as a
result of the decline of bounded, place-based communities. In pre-modern times, spatiallybounded communities existed simply because they were the only practical way to organize
social life. With the next town over a day’s walk away, the borders of community were
necessarily limited. Technological developments in transportation and communication,
however, began to blur these strong divisions. Today, individuals can now take part in
relationships and groups largely independent of space. ICTs connected to the Internet allow
real-time communication, and 21st century transportation allows for speedy travel when inperson interaction is necessary or desired. The erosion of spatial boundaries coincided with a
weakening of traditional group boundaries. Groups that once commanded complete loyalty
and kept a tight control over who was in and who was out became more fluid and permeable.
Individuals found that they could belong to multiple groups, instead of belonging one, local
community. Unlike pessimistic authors of “community lost” narratives, NI theorists argue that
community continues to exist in ways that is not limited by space. In particular, they argue
that communities are better understood as loosely-knit, specialized interest groups that neither
command nor expect lasting in-group loyalty.
Having articulated NI theorists’ historical account of technological development and
social change preceding the rise of networked individualism, I now turn to the central
theoretical assertions of networked individualism itself.
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The Theoretical Assumptions of Networked Individualism
For NI theorists, the key theoretical difference between traditional place-based
sociality and contemporary social life is the level of freedom offered the individual. In
traditional communities, individuals simply received their social worlds as ready-made, and
they knew their role within it. When they acted in social settings, they did so as a member of a
group with a specific group identity. Networked individuals, on the other hand, are understood
as agents who are free and responsible to create their social world. As Rainie and Wellman put
it, “the individual is at the autonomous center” (2012, p. 7). Elsewhere, Wellman (2007) says
that “each of us is the center of our own universe” (p. 349). Similarly, Chua (2013) writes that
“the theory of networked individualism predicts a situation of autonomous individuals
matching roles to tasks in ways they see fit” (p. 622). As the autonomous center, networked
individuals exist independently of their social relations rather than being constituted by them.
They possess no ready-made script nor belong to any local neighborhood which can provide
all of their needs. They may identify with certain groups, but they have no all-encompassing
group identity.
This assertion of autonomy may seem surprising, given that network theory developed
as a structuralist critique of individualistic variable sociology. Indeed, the driving insight of
early network theory was that the traditional method of using individual-level variables was
inferior to a network approach that took the structure of relationships as the primary causal
variable. Among network theorists, however, there has always been disagreement regarding
the question of structure and agency (Emirbayer and Goodwin 1994; Knox, Savage, and
Harvey 2006; Smith 2010). While some authors make little room for individual agency and
argue that individuals “are networked” (a structuralist determinist account), others argue that
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individuals retain a certain degree of agency, or that “individuals network.” In other words,
for NI theorists, people are autonomous, meaning that they are individuals that stand apart
from their social relations.
This assumption of individual autonomy can be seen in the way that NI theorists
differentiate contemporary social life from pre-modern life in bounded communities.
Consider, for example, the way Rainie and Wellman describe the network individualist era of
human history:
“This is the era of free agents and the spirit of personal agency. But it is not the World
According to Me—it is not a world of autonomous and increasingly isolated individualists. Rather,
it is the World According to the Connected Me, where people armed with potent technology tools
can extend their networks far beyond what was possible in the past and where they face new
constraints and challenges that are outgrowths of networked life. Those primed to take advantage
of this reality are the ones who are motivated to share their stories and ideas and then invite
conversation and feedback” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 19).

This paragraph deserves some careful interpretation, because it initially may seem that
Rainie and Wellman simultaneously declare and deny that we are autonomous agents. They write
that “this is the era of free agents,” but “it is not a world of autonomous… individualists.” What
does it mean to be free agents but not autonomous individualists? The confusion, I believe, arises
because the paragraph contains both an ontological assertion and an empirical observation. The
ontological assertion is that we are autonomous individuals, free to “take advantage of this
reality.” This assertion lies at the core of networked individualism, and sets it apart from strong
structuralist approaches. We are beings who network, rather than beings who are networked. Our
technology has enhanced our freedom to actively construct our social worlds. The empirical
observation, then, is that although we are autonomous actors, we tend to use our autonomy to
15

network and stay connected to others. The claim that “it is not a world of autonomous and
increasingly isolated individualists” is thus best understood not as an ontological description of
human being, but an empirical description that counteracts any isolating tendency of ontological
individualism.
Individual autonomy to construct the social world may lie at the heart of networked
individualism, but this autonomy should not be understood as a complete and utter freedom.
While NI theorists recognize the freedom of individual, they also give room for network
constraints. It is clear, however, that these constraints are limited: “Within networks there is
much possibility for individual agency and autonomously acting ties. People and ties are affected
by their networks, but only partially so. People maneuver to form relationships and find support
from them, ties often operate without much constraint from their environing networks, and
clusters of ties within networks operate privately in domestic spaces than collectively in public
places” (Wellman & Frank 2001, p. 18, emphasis added).
This idea of “limited constraints” represents a strong break from structural determinist
network theories. While structural determinists are likely to argue that structure alone determines
historical development, NI theorists see structure as having an influence that is ultimately subject
to the reflexivity and autonomy of the individual. Constraints in this latter view are thus better
understood as either contractual agreements that are freely chosen or normative patterns that
have not yet been subject to reflexive critique. As such, NI theorists see agency and constraints
on a continuum, with individuals in dense, bounded networks having less agency and individuals
in loose networks having more:
“[W]e assert that people who exist in a dense network of mutually reinforcing relations are
likely to exhibit less active agency. This is because the duties of planning can be diffused
throughout a group. This assertion is based on findings that dense networks lead to norms of
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reciprocity and information sharing (Uehara 1990; Wellman & Wortley 1990), while sparse
networks indicate personal control of information (Freeman 1979; Burt 2005). [We also assert] that
network size is associated with relative levels of agency. Individuals with larger networks are likely
to maintain these networks through active planning and engagement. The fact that their networks
are larger should be seen as products of their ability to actively maintain a large number of
connections and preserve these connections across time-space (Boase et al. 2006)” (Carrasco,
Hogan, Wellman, and Miller 2008, p. 568).

These constraints may be understood as the “costs” of belonging to the network.
Belonging to a dense network such as a traditional, bounded community is said to involve high
costs relating to high expectations of in-group loyalty. Personal networks under networked
individualism, on the other hand, offer more freedom and are less demanding. Even so, the ties in
personal networks are not free of constraints. According to NI theorists, networked individuals
must fulfill social obligations—social norms and expectations—if they are to maintain viable
network relations. Accepted social roles and social etiquette in particular limit the ways in which
individuals can treat and use their ties. Boyfriends and girlfriends, for example, are expected to
act a certain way in reverence to the relation—breaking these expectations is often grounds for
breaking off the relationship. According to Chua (2013) “even as people build specialized
systems of social support based on autonomous decisions, structural forces constrain the context
within which those autonomous decisions are made” (p. 603). For every tie there is usually some
level of obligation that needs to be met if the tie is to persist.
The freedom of networked individuals is thus not a complete and radical autonomy, but a
freedom to shape and structure one’s social world according to one’s personal desires. Returning
to the NI theorists’ historical account, as social life shifted away from taken-for-granted groupcentric sociality and the individual became more aware of his/her freedom, the individual also
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became more personally responsible for learning the skills and doing the work to secure the
benefits of social life.
“The networked operating system gives people new ways to solve problems and meet
social needs. It offers more freedom to individuals than people experienced in the past because now
they have more room to maneuver and more capacity to act on their own. At the same time, the
networked individualism operating system requires that people develop new strategies and skills
for handling problems. [Networked individuals] must devote more time and energy to practicing
the art of networking than their ancestors did. Except in emergencies, they can no longer passively
let the village take care of them and control them. They must actively network. They need to
expend effort and sometimes money to maintain their ties near and far; choose whether to phone,
visit, or electronically connect with others; remember which members of their network are useful
for what sorts of things (including just hanging out); and forge useful alliances among network
members who might not previously have known each other. In short, networked individualism is
both socially liberating and socially taxing” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 9).

The freedom of networked individuals is thus a freedom to choose network relations to
which the self becomes obligated, rather than a freedom to reap any desired end without cost.
However, in order for networked individualism to make any logical sense, these constraints
cannot supersede the limits of an individual’s autonomy. Put another way, networked
individualism must at least allow for the possibility that individuals can be completely isolated
as individuals outside of any network, free of any social constraints or obligations. If this were
not the case, then the vision of an “era of free agents” would merely be an illusion, wherein
individuals think they are free to construct their social worlds but are in reality determined by
some outside force. For this reason, the ontological assertion of personal autonomy is the
foundation without which networked individualism could not exist. Without this assertion,
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networked individualism would be indistinguishable from structural determinist accounts.
Again, according to NI theorists, we are fundamentally beings who network, rather than
beings who are networked.
NI theorists’s historical account of the development of networked individualism raises
questions about the status of this ontological claim. What do Rainie and Wellman mean when
they say that “This is the era of free agents and the spirit of personal agency”? Are they implying
that the ontology of human beings fundamentally changed, meaning we are new and different
creatures than we once were? I do not read them as going this far. Elsewhere, Rainie and
Wellman describe the network “revolution” in terms of a “discovery.” They write that “Networks
have always been with us, although they are more prevalent now and we are certainly paying
more attention to them” (56). NI theorists have made similar claims in other places (Chua,
Madej, and Wellman 2011; Wellman 2001). In other words, autonomous individualism did not
suddenly spring into being as a new human essence, but is rather a feature of human being that
has always existed but that has only recently been able to reach a more full expression through
networked individualism.
The assertion of personal autonomy leads to questions about motivation. If individuals
are truly free and autonomous, why do they choose to enter into social relations? In pre-modern
times, this could be explained somewhat in terms of strong social norms. Individuals entered into
social relations because they just took the world for granted. When those norms and patterns
break down and autonomous individuals discover their freedom, however, how are social
relations justified? The implicit assumption within networked individualism is that social
relations are to be understood primarily in terms of capital and profit for the autonomous self. In
this they are indebted to social capital theory. As Lin (1999) candidly puts it,
“The premise behind the notion of social capital is rather simple and straightforward:
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investment in social relations with expected returns. This general definition is consistent with
various renditions by all scholars who have contributed to the discussion (Bourdieu, 1983/1986;
Bourdieu, 1980; Burt, 1992; Coleman, 1988; Coleman, 1990; Erickson, 1995; Erickson, 1996;
Flap, 1994; Flap, 1991; Lin, 1982; Lin, 1995; Portes, 1998; Putnam, 1993; Putnam, 1995a).
Individuals engage in interactions and networking in order to produce profits” (pp. 30-31).

Compare’s Lin’s admission with Rainie and Wellman’s description of networked
individualism:
“Different networks operate in different ways. Many provide havens: a sense of belonging
and being helped. Many provide bandages: emotional aid and services that help people cope with
the stresses and strains of their situations. Still others provide safety nets that lessen the effects of
acute crises and chronic difficulties. They all provide social capital: interpersonal resources not
only to survive and thrive, but also to change situations (houses, jobs, spouses) or to change the
world or at least their neighborhood (organizing major political activity, local school board
politics)… In a world of networked individuals, those who engage in the mutual exchange of
intangible or mundane resources have the potential to thrive. These individuals will seek support
and seek to provide support. Further, those individuals who are able to balance relationships with
people in the various sectors of their social networks—kin, friends, neighbors, associates, and
workmates— are better positioned to receive both broad and specialized support” (Rainie and
Wellman 2012, p. 19).

According to these NI theorists, effectively building and maintaining personal networks
provides individuals with a stable supply of social capital. This capital can be used however the
self sees fit; social capital in this view is merely the power “to change situations.” Thus, to
answer the question of the motivation to network, individuals are indeed autonomous and have
their freedom to construct their social world as they see fit, but they tend to network and
socialize in order to build up stores of social capital that help them meet their personal needs and
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desires. This capital is not necessarily used in selfish ways—social capital can be and is often
leveraged for altruistic ends—but it is nevertheless understood as an instrument: a power , or
resource to be used by the self in the pursuit of its own aims.
The assumed instrumental motivation for social life carries implications for how NI
theorists understand the ontology of human relations. Simply put, NI theorists understand
relations as objects that are separate from the self and that can be instrumentally leveraged to
reach some desired end. In this way, networked individualism relies on the classic Cartesian
subject-object divide to explain human relations. Using the language of network theory,
autonomous individuals forge “ties,” with other individuals. These ties can be “strong,” “weak,”
or “absent,” and they provide different benefits accordingly (Granovetter 1973). Rainie and
Wellman (2012) add that ties “vary in (1) quality —for example, whether the relation provides
emotional aid or companionship; (2) quantity —how much emotional aid and how frequent the
companionship; (3) multiplexity —the bundling of relationships in a tie, such as friends who
provide emotional aid and frequent companionship; and (4) symmetry —for example, which
types of people who get emotional aid do not give it back” (p. 48).
As objects separate from an egocentric self, ties are forged and used by the self.
Significantly, ties can be made or broken at any time. Breaking ties changes an individual’s
network, but it does not fundamentally alter the subjectivity of the individual because the tie is
an object that stands apart from the fundamental constitution of the individual. Individuals who
dispassionately make and break ties certainly risk backlash from people who do not enjoy being
treated as disposable objects (McEwen and Wellman 2013; O'Connell 2012), but the ontological
framework assumed by NI theorists takes ties and networks to be objects that do not
fundamentally alter the freedom of the autonomous individual. In this way, ties are instruments
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in the same way that a hammer is an instrument. Both social ties and hammers are objects which
can be leveraged as instruments for bringing to pass some desired end of the self. Ties differ
from hammers inasmuch as they require a different kind of work and can be leveraged for a
wider variety of ends, but social ties do not alter one’s individuality any more than a hammer
does.
Another significant feature of network ties is that they are abstract entities that stand apart
from physical reality. Ties may be objects in the sense that they are recognized and leveraged by
autonomous individuals, but they are not seen or handled in an empirical sense. Contemporary
social networking software and websites do make ties visible (Facebook includes a button to
“see” a friendship between two linked members), but the tie itself is merely an abstraction used
to establish a path for social exchanges. According to Slife (2004): “Objectification can only
occur through abstraction. The objects must be abstracted from their concrete contexts, because
in their fundamental realness – in their practical and concrete realities – all things are
ontologically related to their context and can qualitatively change as their contexts change. If a
person dying of frigid temperatures, for instance, discovers a cache of wooden tennis rackets, the
rackets are firewood. Only an abstraction from this deadly situation allows the person to identify
the fuel that provides life-giving warmth as something used in a game. All things, in this sense,
are concretely dependent upon, rather than independent of, their contexts” (Slife 2004, p. 159).”
As abstractions, ties can be called up at any time to perform a desired task. Stated differently, the
theorization of ties as abstractions, as objects, makes possible the theorization of such ties as
instruments to be used by individuals to construct their personal networks.
As abstract objects, ties carry particular meanings that allow effective
instrumentalization. The meaning of a tie is created by the autonomous holder of the tie, who
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gives the tie a specialized purpose. Often, purposes are aligned with particular social roles.
“Personal communities are usually specialized, with different network members helping in
various ways. The exception is spouses who supply each other with many types of support.
Friends are valued as confidants and social companions. Neighbors and coworkers are
conveniently suited for handling unexpected emergencies because their nearness enables them to
react quickly with goods and services. Parents, adult children, and in-laws often provide
emotional and long-term support: financial aid, emotional aid, large and small services such as
childcare, health care, and home repairs” (Rainie and Wellman, 2012, pp. 135-136). Once ties are
adequately labeled, they can be called upon to perform a particular task.

1

As objects that are instrumental in bringing about the desired ends, the main variable
affecting the quality of one’s social life is the skillfulness and work of the networked
individual. Ties require work from the self if the self is to reap any benefits. Networked
individuals who don’t have strong networks—networks characterized by a large number of
ties that provide a wide variety of resources and who are able and willing to help when in
need—are said to lack the requisite skills or effort. This point will become especially relevant
when examining the social affordances of ICTs according to networked individualism.
In light of these developments, let us reinterpret the networked individualism narrative
of the social network revolution. First, NI theorists see humans as fundamentally autonomous
and egocentric individuals, meaning that among other things, they have the freedom to create
and manage their social world. Although humans have always used this freedom to a certain
extent (networks have always been with us), personal autonomy was greatly limited and

Parallels can also be drawn here with Heidegger’s concept of “present-at-hand.” According to Heidegger, this is a
way of engaging the world in terms of abstractions and theories. Significantly, Heidegger argues that this is not the
primary way we live, but a way we only live when something goes wrong or breaks. See: Heidegger, Martin. 1996.
Being and time: A Translation of Sein und Zeit: State University of New York Press.
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unknown during much of human history. During this pre-modern era, humans lived in
spatially-bound, tightly-knit communities. As transportation and communication technologies
developed, spatial barriers began to erode. Similarly, weakening social barriers permitted
more flexibility for social life. These changes led individuals to more fully discover their
freedom to create their own human relations. The collapse of traditional place-based
communities left individuals at risk, however. Individuals still had needs and desires which
were best fulfilled by relying on others. Rather than lapsing into isolation, however,
individuals began relying more and more on networks as a way to live with others and meet
their personal needs. Networks became the ideal solution to this problem inasmuch as they
allowed individuals to use their personal autonomy while simultaneously providing social
needs. Individuals still had to meet certain obligations in order ensure that they reaped the
benefits of social ties, but the shift to networks allowed these obligations to be freely accepted
or rejected.
At this point, we can summarize the main assertions of networked individualism as a
theoretical framework:
1. The self is an autonomous and egocentric agent
2. As an autonomous and egocentric agent, the self forges, manages, and uses
relations/ties to create their own personal networks
3. Relations are abstractions with specialized meanings that exist independently of the
self and which are instrumental in providing the self with capital
4. Social norms and expectations constrain the way in which the self forges, manages
and uses ties, but the self is free to choose which ties (and subsequently, which
constraints) to develop.
The Affordances of ICTs According to Networked Individualism
Having articulated NI theorists’ view of social reality, we are ready to turn to the question
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of the social affordances of ICTs. I argue here that using networked individualism as a theoretical
framework carries significant implications for how we understand the affordances of ICTs on
human relations.
Informed by the assertions discussed above, NI theorists see the impact of technological
development primarily in terms of connectivity and social capital. They discuss how the social
network revolution was enhanced by the developments of modern communication and
transportation technologies. In the 19th century, the barriers of time and space began to break
down with the arrival of the telegraph and the railroad. Messages that once took days or weeks to
deliver could now be delivered in seconds, and voyages which were once impractical or
dangerous became relatively easy. These revolutionary inventions were soon followed by the
telephone and the automobile, and in time, the airplane. Relationships between individuals could
now be easily sustained across huge distances, and entrepreneurs could work with useful
connections virtually anywhere on the globe. The place-based community, once a necessity,
became optional—individuals could now build their social worlds however they saw fit.
Continuing the narrative, NI theorists argue that the arrival of the Internet in the late 20th
century further strengthened the network revolution and eventually became a primary resource
for managing social networks. The final technological development for networked individualism
came with the mobile revolution, however, which allowed individuals to engage their networks
regardless of time or space. The contemporary smartphone is the apex device for the networked
individual, combining the possibilities of the Internet with the mobility of the cell phone.
Why are contemporary ICTs, including smart phones, so significant for NI theorists?
Recall that networked individuals are free and responsible to create and manage their social
worlds. ICTs and the Internet are a critical resource for networked individuals because they are
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exceedingly adept at helping individuals perform the work of building and maintaining social
networks. Truthfully, it might be said that the existence of mobile ICTs made networked
individualism a feasible reality in the first place. Manuel Castells (2002) predicted the
importance of these mobile devices for networked individuals, saying, “The projected
development of the wireless Internet increases the chances of personalized networking to a wide
range of social situations, thus enhancing the capacity of individuals to rebuild structures of
sociability from the bottom up” (p. 132). Without the corresponding technological developments
that make networking more efficient and easy, life as a networked individual might be more
similar to previous generations, in that place would continue to have more relevance.
For NI theorists, ICTs and the Internet are integral tools for the networked individual for
several interrelated reasons. First, ICTs and the Internet are, by definition, ways to overcome
spatial and temporal boundaries (Friedland and Boden 1994; Giddens 2013). Communications
that originally took days or weeks can now be transmitted instantly, without needing to move
one's body more than a few finger motions. For social relations, this means that individuals can
easily maintain relations with others outside of their limited geographical area. Free from the
limitations of time and space, individuals can thus procure and maintain relations based on
interest and need, rather than geographic fate. To be sure, humans have maintained relations with
individuals across chasms of time and space for millenia, but the rapidity of contemporary
technology allows for distant others to play more central roles in the lives of individuals and
empowers the individual to network according to one's liking.
Second, the Internet offers networked individuals a virtually infinite resource for
establishing ties and building social capital. In seconds, a savvy networked individual can bond
with others online with similar interests and needs or consult experts that can help with one's
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personal dilemmas. With the rise of social media and social networking sites, the possibilities for
social capital continue to grow. Furthermore, in addition to serving as a database for forging new
ties, the Internet also makes it easy for networked individuals to maintain existing ties and
coordinate social action.
Third, the proliferation of mobile devices, including smart phones, allows networked
individuals to remain constantly connected to their personal networks. As long as the networked
individual has built and maintained a sufficiently healthy social network, he/she is able to draw
on the capital of the network at virtually any time, and in any place. On the flip side, mobile
devices allow the networked individual to offer help and maintain network ties at any time and
place.
In sum, ICTs and the Internet are important for NI theorists because they free networked
individuals from the constraints of time and space; provide infinite resources for forging ties; and
effectively place the social world at one's personal command. NI theorists have described these
advantages at length (Line, Jain, and Lyons 2011; McEwen 2010; Rainie and Wellman 2012;
Rheingold 2012; Tillema, Dijst, and Schwanen 2010). These capacities enhance the freedom of
networked individuals to create their social networks according to their interests and desires, and
they also make it easier for networked individuals to do the work of managing the personal
network.
We arrive at this theoretical understanding of the affordances of ICTs for human relations
when we begin with a framework of networked individualism. For this reason, Rainie and
Wellman are highly supportive of ICTs. Indeed, they go so far as to say that “thriving” in the 21st
century will be largely dependent on one’s ability to effectively network using the ICTs which
are available. They write:
“The underlining theme of this book is that it is a networked world, and that being networked is not
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so scary. Rather, it provides opportunities for people to thrive if they know how to maneuver in it.
Arguably, the emerging divide in this world is not the ‘digital divide’ but the ‘network divide.’
Technology continues to spread through populations, so the emerging need is for people to learn
how to cultivate their networks—and to get out from the cocoon of their bounded groups” (p. 255)

In other words, networked individualism and ICTs present opportunities and challenges
for social life, and those who skillfully manage and exploit their networks will reap the rewards
while avoiding the negative possibilities (such as isolation). In fact, many authors have argued
that the true “digital divide” is a difference of skill, and that inequality is reproduced with ICTs
because technology users have varying degrees of skill in using their devices (Hampton 2010;
Hargittai 2008; Hargittai and Hinnant 2008; Hargittai and Shafer 2006; Howard, Busch, and
Sheets 2010; Rheingold 2012). At the end of Networked, Rainie and Wellman provide a list of
things that network individuals ought to know and do in order to ensure these desirable
outcomes. This list includes networking advice (“develop meaningful new ties as you go along
and be especially alert to reaching into new social circles that serve your purposes”), ethical
advice (“invest in existing relationships via the Golden Rule so that help will be there when
needed”), psychological advice (“segment your identity”), and pragmatic advice (“manage time
well; multitask strategically”), which all fall under a general category they call “networking
literacy.” Their bottom line is that individuals who are “network literate” will be able to have
healthy social lives that meet their personal needs.
Of course, network individuals are not completely free to network any way they like if
they want to be successful—they are still subject to the sanctioning power of social norms. The
second implication for the proliferation of ICTs for networked individuals is that new
opportunities to network will come into conflict with existing norms of social etiquette.
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“The old rules of etiquette and courtesy are reconfiguring in this new environment that enables
users to conduct their private business in public places… As with earlier technologies, societies are
still adjusting to what is acceptable behavior while using mobile devices” (Rainie and Wellman
2012, pp. 105-106).

In many ways, evolving social norms of ICT use inform the possibilities and definitions of
“networking literacy.” According to these NI theorists, networking within the bounds of these
constraints is an important skill for networked individuals to develop.
To summarize, when we look at technological developments with a lens of networked
individualism we find that ICTs impact human relations by 1) enhancing the freedom and ability
of networked individuals to create and manage their social world and 2) creating social conflict
by challenging and reconfiguring existing norms regarding what is socially acceptable behavior.
For NI theorists, the implication is that maintaining healthy and viable human relations is a
matter of developing skills and knowledge associated with “networking literacy.” When seen in
this light, it becomes clear why these authors believe that ICTs are generally positive
developments—these devices can greatly enhance our relations without fundamentally altering
them or reducing their quality.
NI theorists offer an attractive account of ICTs and human relations, but it should be
noted that the conclusions of these authors rely on a particular set of theoretical underpinnings.
Their claims that ICTs “enhance” and “augment,” and are “beneficial” to human relations
ultimately hinge on the ontological understanding of human relations discussed above. Whether
we agree with the proponents of networked individualism that ICTs are mostly beneficial for
human relations will depend on whether we agree with their particular understanding of social
life and human relations. In the next chapter, I suggest that the assumptions of networked
individualism as discussed above are limited in significant ways.
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CHAPTER 2: LIMITATIONS OF NETWORKED INDIVIDUALISM
As a theory of social life, networked individualism understands human relations as
social ties which are managed by the self and which provide the self with standing reserves of
social capital. NI theorists argue that with the right skillset and a certain amount of work,
healthy networks of relationships can be established which effectively meet the ends and
goals of egocentric agents. With this framework, ICTs are seen as having a positive impact on
human relations, inasmuch as they allow individuals to network more efficiently and
effectively. We are left to wonder, however, whether networked individualism is an adequate
account of social life. Could it be that there are certain dimensions of human relations which
cannot be described in terms of “ties” and “capital,” and which cannot be made available and
called on with skills and work? In this chapter I take up this question using Martin
Heidegger’s work on enframing (1993). With the idea of enframing Heidegger seeks to show
how modern technology reduces the world to a store of standing resources for the self thereby
covering over alternative ways of knowing and being. Extending this concept, I argue that
networked individualism forwards the enframing of the world that Heidegger describes.
Heidegger and Enframing
The German philosopher Martin Heidegger published an influential essay in 1954 entitled
“The Question Concerning Technology.” In this essay, Heidegger attempts to describe what he
believes to be the “essence” of modern technology. He coins the word “enframing” to describe
this essence. Before we can talk about enframing, however, we must understand something about
Heidegger’s understanding of truth. According to Heidegger, what normally counts as truth in the
western world has been strictly limited to abstract knowledge and facts. Heidegger sees this as a
dangerous limitation that we have inherited from modern philosophy. Contrary to this limited
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conception, Heidegger argues that truth is better understood as ‘revealing,’ which goes beyond
abstract knowledge and embraces all the ways in which we can relate to things in the world. As
beings-in-the-world, we reveal the truth about the objects around us by using and relating with
them, rather than sitting back and thinking about them. An object in the world presents itself to
us on its own terms, and the truth which is revealed to us is dependent on our orientation or
attitude. Consider an example of a cathedral. To an atheist, the cathedral might be revealed as a
beautiful structure to be admired for aesthetic and architectural merit. To a believer, on the other
hand, the church might be revealed as a sacred place of worship. Paradoxically, both are valid
truths or revealings; both belong to the Being of the Cathedral, which reveals itself in different
ways to actors with different orientations.
When Heidegger writes about the implications of modern technology, he writes with an
understanding that technology is itself a way of revealing the world. What concerns Heidegger is
not the machines themselves, but a particular human orientation that drives the development and
use of modern technology which reveals the world in a limited, destructive way. Heidegger calls
this human orientation “enframing,” which he says “is nothing technological, nothing on the
order of a machine. It is the way in which the real reveals itself as standing reserve” (p. 312).
According to Heidegger, enframing—this human orientation by which the world is revealed as a
standing reserve of exploitable resources—is the essence of modern technology.
Heidegger provides several examples of the way in which modern technology reveals the
world in this limited way. In the following example, he compares the old technology of the
windmill to modern extractive industries:
“What is modern technology? It too is a revealing. Only when we allow our attention to rest on this
fundamental characteristic does that which is new in modern technology show itself to us.
“And yet the revealing that holds sway throughout modern technology does not unfold into a

31

bringing-forth in the sense of poiesis. The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging
[Herausfordern], which puts to nature the unreasonable demand that it supply energy that can be
extracted and stored as such. But does this not hold true for the old windmill as well? No. Its sails do
indeed turn in the wind; they are left entirely to the wind’s blowing. But the windmill does not unlock
energy from the air currents in order to store it. In contrast, a tract of land is challenged into the putting
out of coal and ore. The earth now reveals itself as a coal mining district, the soil as a mineral deposit.
The field that the peasant formerly cultivated and set in order [bestellte] appears differently than it did
when to set in order still meant to take care of and to maintain. The work of the peasant does not
challenge the soil of the field. In the sowing of the grain it places the seed in the keeping of the forces of
growth and watches over its increase. But meanwhile even the cultivation of the field has come under
the grip of another kind of setting-in-order, which sets upon [stellt] nature. It sets upon it in the sense of
challenging it. Agriculture is now the mechanized food industry. Air is now set upon to yield nitrogen,
the earth to yield ore, ore to yield uranium, for example; uranium is set upon to yield atomic energy,
which can be released either for destruction or for peaceful use” (p. 309).

When Heidegger refers to poiesis he refers to a particular kind of revealing that is open to
generating previously unknown truths about being. The windmill allows for this kind of
revealing because although it uses the power of the wind, it allows the wind to be more than this
use. The modern extractive industries, by contrast, challenge nature to be nothing more than the
standing reserve we desire. In perhaps a more poignant example, Heidegger refers to the Rhine
River to show how technology transforms our orientation to the world. With the erection of a
hydroelectric dam, Heidegger says that “even the Rhine itself appears as something at our
command” (p. 309). He goes so far as to say that even the tourism industry which is built to
appreciate the natural beauty of the Rhine transforms the natural world into a source of profit.
The enemy for Heidegger is thus the human drive to obtain a quantifiable and
controllable knowledge of the world that inspires humanity to adopt an orientation that views the
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world as a set of raw materials or "standing-reserve", an orientation which perhaps culminates in
modern science and modern technology. Enframing is thus a threat to humanity because it is an
all-encompassing worldview that leaves nothing untouched—it seeks to bring all under its
control. It reveals the world as a standing reserve, and it tends to preclude other revelations.
Heidegger describes the threat as follows: “The threat to humanity does not come in the first
instance from the potentially lethal machines and apparatuses of technology. The actual threat
has already afflicted humanity in its essence. The rule of enframing threatens humanity with the
possibility that it could be denied to him to enter into a more original revealing and hence to
experience the call of a more primal truth.” (p. 314)
What, then, is threatened by enframing? Everything, essentially. The natural world is
threatened by encroaching industry and all the byproducts of modern society. Being and truth are
threatened because enframing hides alternative ways of being and knowing the world. Humanity
itself is threatened because, as Heidegger says, even humans may come to be seen as one more
standing reserve. Regarding this last point, we can see horrifying examples of enframing when
humans are seen as mere resources to be used as parts of the national war machine. Indeed,
Bauman’s (2001) sociological account of what made the Holocaust possible could be understood
in terms of a targeted enframing of particular marginalized groups. It the case of the Holocaust,
however, the Jews and other victims were enframed not as resources, but as “impurities” to be
removed.
Salvation
Many authors, including the preeminent technology scholar Bruno Latour (1999), have
criticized Heidegger for being a pessimistic technological determinist. As Kochan (2010) points
out, however, “while Heidegger was indeed deeply critical of modern technology, he was not a

33

technological determinist. He neither took technology to be an insuperable force that enslaves
humans as its instrumental puppets, nor maintained that there is no way out of the predicament
into which modernity has brought us. Indeed, Heidegger writes that the central aim of his
analysis of technology is ‘to prepare a free relation to it.’’’ (p. 584). Logically this makes sense—
if Heidegger believed that technology were an insuperable force, why would he waste his time
writing so much about it (unless he were merely trying to ride the wave and eke out a profit)?
Heidegger finds inspiration in the words of the German poet, Friedrich Hölderlin, who
penned the following lines:
"”But where danger is, grows / The saving power also."
According to Heidegger, although enframing itself is a destructive force, if we reflect on
our power to enframe, we will come to the realization that we, as humans, are part of the
coming-into-being or revealing of the world, and are thus responsible as caretakers of Being. The
purpose of his critique is to provide exactly that reflection on enframing, and thus loosen the grip
of enframing and allow for alternative ways-of-being and revealing.
This hope is rooted in the fact that even though humanity’s orientation toward the world
is one of enframing and exploitation, the primal relation in which the physical world presents
itself on its own terms persists. Put differently, despite humanity’s tendency to see the world in
terms of resources to control, the world continues to exist in its fullness of being, and continues
to carry the possibilities of other ways of revealing. Modern food production, for example, takes
pigs as resources for human consumption and treats them accordingly. Despite this reduction,
however, pigs continue to be pigs, and there remains the possibility to adopt a new orientation
that reveals the pigs as something more than a standing resource. Again, the purpose of
Heidegger’s critique is not to predict a grim and unalterable future of humanity, but to show us
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how to establish a “free relation” to our technology, meaning a relation in which we are
constantly critical and constantly questioning in order to become more open to that which might
be revealed to us.
Networked Individualism as an Example of Enframing
ICTs, I suggest, are also subject to this enframing described by Heidegger, and the theory
of networked individualism is evidence of this enframing. Recall that according to networked
individualism, individuals are autonomous and egocentric agents who have the freedom and
obligation to manage their social world. They are in a never-ending quest to shore up their stores
of social capital to be used when needed, and to do this, they create specialized ties which can be
drawn on to meet their desired ends. To make this work more efficient and effective, networked
individuals rely heavily on ICTs which allow them to transcend the limitations of time and space.
Just as a hydroelectric dam brought the Rhine River under Germany’s command, ICTs more
fully bring human relations under the control of the self. In other words, enframing as Heidegger
describes is alive and well, and we have reached the point that Heidegger feared, where even
humanity is taken as a standing reserve. The theory of networked individualism is an orientation
toward the social world which takes human beings as standing reserves of social capital for the
ego and which promotes and justifies certain attitudes and behaviors that hide alternative ways of
perceiving human relations. To understand why this is so, we need to look no further than NI
theorists’ own descriptions of networked individualism and their tips on how to “thrive as a
networked individual.” The message is clear: network and build relationships however you can
so that you can have the help you need to meet your personal needs.
We do not need to deny that it might be a good thing for individuals to develop personal
networks in order to sustain this critique. Heidegger would not deny that hydroelectric dams are
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useful tools in the world. Similarly, networked individualism shows how individuals might
channel capital to solve real problems. This ability has been magnified in recent years with the
invention of crowdfunding platforms (Gass 2011). Again, the concern for Heidegger is not that
the instrumental way of revealing the world is invalid, but that it sets itself up as a fundamental
Truth of the world and overlooks alternative ways of knowing and being. An enframed world is
one that is so enamored with its ability to control and create resources that it crowds out the
possibility of our being in the world any other way. NI theorists have taught us that human
relations can be understood in terms of resources for the self, but is this the entire truth of human
relations? Heidegger would say no. Heidegger’s goal and mine as well is to free our devices from
the limiting orientation of enframing that reveals us solely as autonomous individuals and
overlooks alternative, and perhaps more meaningful, understandings of human relations.
In order to break out of the enframing of networked individualism, I turn to the ethical
phenomenology of Emmanuel Levinas, whose account of human relations is radically
different from the egocentric theory of networked individualism described above. As I will
show, by using an alternative theory of human relations that is truly relational and does not
reduce human relations to objects which are under the command of the self, we open up new
and rich possibilities for studying the social impact of ICTs. Significantly, we begin to see that
there may be more to human relations than what can be subjected to the maximizing powers
of technology.
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CHAPTER 3: EMMANUEL LEVINAS AND THE ETHICAL RELATION
In the previous chapter I suggested that networked individualism is an example of the
destructive, enframing essence of modern technology. In this chapter, I offer an alternative view
of human relations, which is hidden by the enframing essence of networked individualism.
Emmanuel Levinas
Emmanuel Levinas was a twentieth-century French philosopher with Lithuanian Jewish
ancestry. Although he was spared the worst of the German targeting of the Jews during World
War II, he did spend time in a prisoner of war camp, and many of his family were killed at the
hands of SS troops, including his father and brother. These and other experiences eventually
helped shape his life’s work, which can be seen as an ethical critique of the work of other
phenomenologists, including Martin Heidegger. The ethical and relational phenomenology
articulated by Levinas has been increasingly influential in social science, visible in areas
including law (Manderson 2006), health (Clifton-Soderstrom 2003; Lindh, Severinsson, and
Berg 2007), psychology (Clegg and Slife 2005; Kunz 1998; Slife and Richardson 2008),
sociology (Elliott 2003; Lash 1996; Raffel 2002), therapy (Larner 2011; Larner, Rober, and
Strong 2004), education (Child, Williams, Birch, and Boody 1995; Standish 2001), feminism
(Chanter 2001; Perpich 2008), and communication and technology (Boothroyd 2009; Miller
2012; Pinchevski 2005), among others.
Levinas’s philosophical project is a good alternative to networked individualism because
it offers an almost diametrically opposed perspective of human relations. Whereas the relations
of networked individuals are objects that are consciously created and managed, Levinas argues
that relations are received immediately as gifts upon encountering another person, before the self
can give any kind of approval. This is a key point, but one that can be easily missed because
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network theorists and Levinas both describe their approaches as “relational.” The difference
between network relationality and Levinasian relationality can be understood as a difference
between “weak” and “strong” relationality. According to Slife (2004): "Unlike weak relationality,
where essentially self-contained objects must cross time and space to influence one another
through traditional cause and effect, strong relationality assumes that objects are instantaneously
or even simultaneously present with other objects. They are not only influential but also
constitutive of the very nature of beings or events” (p. 160). “[R]elationships are not just the
interactions of what was originally nonrelational; relationships are relational ‘all the way down’
(p. 159). Stated differently, for Levinas, relations are not something that one has, but something
that defines who one is.
Distinguishing between weak and strong relationality casts new insight on the strong
distinction between traditional community and networked individualism. Whereas NI theorists
believe that increased reflexivity and personal autonomy signified a radical change in social life,
Levinas would argue that traditional community and networked individualism are two sides of
the same coin. This is so because both traditional and modern accounts of human life rely on
“weak” relationality to explain human relations. Whether authors fear the rise of isolated
individualism as a result of community collapse or champion newly-found agency, both views
rely on an account of human relations that takes them as objects apart from the self. Were this not
so, individuals could neither be isolated without relations nor free to choose them. This
difference between Levinas and other approaches should become clearer later on.
One way of understanding Levinas’s project is to see it as a phenomenological account of
what it is like to encounter another person. By phenomenological, I refer to a particular approach
that stands in contrast to traditional theory-driven empirical research. According to Knapp
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(forthcoming):
“Phenomenology is less a theory about the social world than an investigative approach that
seeks to further understanding through highly reflective and careful analysis of experience. As the
study of “phenomena,” or the study of that which appears or that which “shows itself,”
phenomenology is a profoundly non-theoretical approach to social science. Rather than begin with
concepts, the construction of variables, and the goal of explanation, phenomenology proposes to
take up the ontological question, “What is X (the phenomena we seek to study)?”, most directly:
through examination of how it is experienced. Phenomenology is therefore to be understood more
as an investigative approach that seeks to first describe rather than explain human phenomena.”

In the case of Levinas, he begins by asking what/who I encounter when I encounter
another person. This question may appear odd and perhaps out of place, but it is the critical
question for Levinas, and as we will see, his entire project emerges from this initial question. To
begin, it is helpful to compare the encounter with another person to what Levinas calls the
“natural attitude.” According to Levinas, before I encounter another person, I live my life and
attend to my needs by totalizing objects around me. “Totalize” here refers to understanding
objects conceptually as things that fulfill my wants and needs. The food I eat, the tools I use, the
shelter I seek—I totalize these things by comprehending them in terms of usefulness for myself,
which allows me to control my life and consume at will. According to most social theories,
including networked individualism, the encounter with another person is simply another relation
of totality: it is an encounter with something, meaning that the ego encounters the other as some
kind of object that is known in some way. Even Heidegger, despite his strong critique of
instrumentalism, struggled to break out of this egocentric way of understanding human relations.
Says Levinas: “The being of animals is a struggle for life. A struggle for life without ethics. It is
a question of might. Heidegger says at the beginning of Being and Time that Dasein is a being
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who in his being is concerned for this being itself. That’s Darwin’s idea: the living being
struggles for life. The aim of being is being itself. However, with the appearance of the human –
and this is my entire philosophy – there is something more important than my life, and that is the
life of the other” (Levinas 1988, p. 172)
Levinas agrees that we can and do relate to one another as things, but he asserts that the
primordial encounter with the other is an encounter with someone, rather than something.
Levinas says that I encounter the other in conceptual terms as something—as a professor or a
student or as someone who dresses in a certain way or says certain things—but that this
encounter is secondary to the primordial encounter of the “Other” as wholly other. What does it
mean to be “wholly other?” First, it refers to the fact that “the Other” is a particular other, rather
than some abstract notion of another person. As a particular other, the Other, or this particular
person, is irreplaceable and completely unique. Second, “wholly other” refers to what Levinas
calls the “alterity” of the other. Alterity refers to difference or otherness, but alterity here is not
simply a difference of attributes or knowable traits. “[B]efore any attribute, you are other than I,
other otherwise, absolutely other! And it is this alterity, different from the one which is linked to
attributes, that is your alterity. This alterity is not justifiable logically; it is logically indiscernible.
The identity of the I is not the result of any knowledge whatsoever: I find myself without looking
for myself. You are you and I am I. This cannot be reduced to the fact that we differ because of
our bodies or because of the color of our hair, or by the place we occupy in space.” (Levinas and
Robbins 2001, p. 49). Put another way, to encounter the Other is to encounter someone rather
than something, meaning it is to encounter an Other who is radically different than me and who
is not reducible to any amount of conceptual knowledge.
Consider the dramatic contrast between Levinas’s concept of alterity and the network
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concept of ties. Whereas NI theorists argue that the relation with another person is a specialized
tie whose meaning is given and changeable by the self, Levinas argues that the Other is wholly
other and is always more than any reductive label that I may apply. As we will see, this
fundamental difference between an encounter with a knowable thing and an encounter with an
unknowable Other will lead to dramatically different ideas of human relations and subjectivity.
The encounter with the Other happens when I encounter the “face” of the Other. “Face”
here should not be taken literally, although the physical face is certainly one way of encountering
the other. Rather, the “face” of the Other is anything that signifies the presence of the Other
before me. Levinas writes: “the face is signification [but] signification without context. I mean
that the Other, in the rectitude of his face, is not a character within a context. Ordinarily one is a
“character”: a professor at the Sorbonne, a Supreme Court justice, son of so-and-so, everything
that is in one’s passport, the manner of dressing, of presenting oneself. And all signification in
the usual sense of the term is relative to such a context: the meaning of something is in its
relation to another thing. Here, to the contrary, the face is meaning all by itself. You are you.”
(Levinas and Nemo 1985, p. 86).
This understanding of the encounter with another person as encounter with an
irreplaceable “Other” who cannot be reduced to any amount of conceptual knowledge brings us
to the core of Levinas’s phenomenology: the ethical relation. For Levinas, to encounter another
person as wholly Other is also to experience oneself as one who is called to be-for-the-Other. My
encounter with the Other transforms my being such that I find my subjectivity characterized by
an ethical responsibility: I am made able to respond and am called upon to be for-the-Other.
Again, this ethical responsibility arises from the otherness of the Other. The encounter of the
Other as an irreplaceable, infinite being resists my totalization of him/her and proclaims his/her
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infinite worthiness independent of any value I can attribute in terms of myself. I myself am
transformed, finding myself as one who is responsible for this infinite being.
It must be understood that Levinas believes that this description of the ethical relation is
the fundamental reality of subjectivity. He is not merely saying that some people, occasionally
experience the Other in this way. Rather, he argues that all relations with the Other are
fundamentally ethical relations characterized by responsibility. Ethical responsibility, he says, is
“the essential, primary and fundamental structure of subjectivity… Responsibility [for the Other]
in fact is not a simple attribute of subjectivity, as if the latter already existed in itself, before the
ethical relationship. Subjectivity is not for itself; it is, once again, initially for another” (Levinas
& Nemo 1985, pp. 95-96). Stated differently, responsibility exists in every encounter. We may
not always recognize the many ways in which ethical responsibility is manifest, but Levinas
argues that responsibility exists independent of our conscious recognition of it.
It is, of course, possible to totalize and ignore the infinity of the Other—I can treat a taxi
driver as a piece of machinery or a student as one just like all the others—but in doing so I am
not actually reducing the Other, but merely reducing my understanding of them. “I don’t distort
them; I distort myself. I deny myself, not the Other.” (Kunz 1998, p. 37). In other words, because
my subjectivity is defined by my responsibility for the Other, my choice to totalize the Other in
the face of this responsibility amounts to a denial of myself as one-who-is-responsible.
The universality of the ethical relation as the foundation of subjectivity is possible in part
because the reception of the Other is a kind of “radical passivity.” Levinas describes our
reception of the command to be responsible for the Other as “a passivity—but it is a passivity
beneath all passivity” (Levinas 1969, p. 101), meaning that I am called without my consent to
actively serve the needs of the Other. This radical passivity is prior to passivity in the sense of

42

doing nothing to meet the needs of the Other—it makes this latter form of passivity possible as
an active refusal of responsibility for the Other.
To recap so far, I have said that unlike life following the “natural attitude,” in which I
totalize objects as things which are useful to me, my experience of another person is an
encounter of someone who is wholly other and irreplaceable. When I encounter the face of the
Other, I am transformed as one who is responsible-for-the-Other. This transformation, the
reception of this call, is a kind of “radical passivity,” meaning that I am made responsible
without choosing to be so. Finally, although I can deny myself as one-who-is-responsible-forthe-Other, this phenomenological account is the very nature of subjectivity, and is the essence of
all human relations.
We can again see some dramatic differences between Levinas’s phenomenological
account of human relations and the theory of networked individualism. The idea of an
autonomous self who is free to choose and forge relations, a concept which is the foundation of
networked individualism, amounts to a denial of the self in Levinas. Subjectivity for Levinas—
who I am—is defined by ethical responsibility. I am one who finds myself responsible for this
particular Other. The relation is not an object that is separate from my being, but rather,
constitutes my being. Relations are thrust upon me in a radical passivity; there is no freedom to
choose here. By the time I consider how to respond to the ethical call of the Other, I have already
acknowledged my relational subjectivity. This is the difference between “weak” and “strong”
relationality, as discussed above.
It must be understood that the ethical relation is not a product of social norms or a
Kantian system of ethics. Ethics here is “pre-societal,” meaning it exists prior to any societal
influence. It is thus not a “should,” in the sense that one “should” care for the Other. Rather, it is
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the essential nature of our human relations which we experience as a demand. Inasmuch as I
encounter another person, I find myself in an ethical relation, as one-who-is-responsible. To
further illustrate this point, Levinas turns to the example of communication. Specifically, he
compares the word said with the word saying. For Levinas, the said of communication refers to
the whatness of a communication, while the saying refers to the ethical relationality of the
communication. “The saying is the fact that before the face I do not simply remain there
contemplating it, I respond to it. The saying is a way of greeting the Other, but to greet the Other
is already to answer for him. It is difficult to be silent in someone’s presence; this difficulty has
its ultimate foundation in this signification proper to the saying, whatever is the said. It is
necessary to speak of something, of the rain and fine weather, no matter what, but to speak, to
respond to him and already to answer for him” (Levinas and Nemo 1985, p. 88). As one who is
responsible for the Other, I find myself needing to say. What is said, however, is up to me, and
often is highly influenced by my social context. “Should language be thought uniquely as the
communication of an idea or as information, and not also—and perhaps above all—as the fact of
encountering the other as other, that is to say, already as response to him? Is not the first word
bonjour? As simple as bonjour. Bonjour as benediction and my being available for the other
man. It doesn’t mean: what a beautiful day. Rather: I wish you peace, I wish you a good day,
expression of one who worries for the other. It underlies all the rest of communication, underlies
all discourse” (Levinas and Robbins 2001, p. 47) “Bonjour” literally means “good day,” but
Levinas’s point is that the words are merely a socially-derived way to respond positively to one’s
responsibility toward the Other.
I have already hinted at the fact that it is possible to refuse oneself as one who is
responsible for the Other. Indeed, Levinas does not argue that because we are responsible, we
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necessarily act responsibly. He writes that “murder, it is true, is a banal fact: one can kill the
Other; the ethical exigency is not an ontological necessity” (Lévinas & Nemo 1985, p. 87). Put
another way, I am commanded to be responsible toward the Other, but I am not caused to be
responsible. Freedom thus lies not in my ability to choose relations for which I am responsible,
but in my response to my responsibility.
Levinasian relationalism is similar to networked individualism in that the quality of one’s
human relations is dependent on how one uses one’s freedom, but the two approaches differ
significantly when describing how this is done and what quality even means. For NI theorists,
quality is understood as the degree to which a relation is useful for the self, and is primarily a
question of skill and resources. Networked individuals who “thrive” socially are those who
effectively use devices to establish capitally-enriched relations. For Levinas, on the other hand,
quality is understood as the degree to which the self is “true” to the ethical demands of the Other
which constitute one’s subjectivity, and is thus a question of one’s orientation or “way of being”
toward the Other. Quality is thus understood not in terms of “less and more,” but “true or false”
(Warner 2001).
At the beginning of this chapter I said that Levinas presents a fundamentally different
account of human relations from the theory of networked individualism. By now, I hope the
differences are clear. Networked individualism is a theory of social life that begins and ends with
the self. The self of networked individualism creates relations intentionally, according to his/her
needs and wants. In this way, others are first totalized as objects that fulfill some personal need.
For Levinas, by contrast, human relations are not formed out of intentionality, but rather emerge
from a “radical passivity.” In a sense, I do not choose relations, but am chosen. Thus, for
Levinas, the work of the networked individual—of totalizing Others and organizing them into
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networks—is an act which can only come after I find myself responsible for them. In this way,
Levinas accuses NI theorists (and community lost theorists) of completely missing the deeper,
relational character of human relations. Table 1 shows a summary of the main differences
described in this chapter.
[Table 1 about here]
Why might these differences matter when it comes to understanding the social impact of
ICTs? In next chapter, I argue that it matters because what was seen by network scholars as mere
changes in the capacities of the self to create and manage networks actually raises more
fundamental ethical questions. How, for example, do ICTs mediate my encounter of and relation
with the Other? What are the ethical implications of constant availability? How does the ability
to meet the needs of the Other through technology also signify the ethical limits of mediated
communication? As I consider these and other questions, I hope to show that using a Levinasian
understanding of human relations opens up many new and important opportunities for inquiry
that the theory of networked individualism does not adequately capture, and that contrary to the
claims of the proponents of networked individualism, there is more to human relations than what
can be instrumentally secured through skills and network literacy. By ignoring the ethicalrelational foundation of human relations, NI theorists conceive of ICTs as instrumental devices
and contribute to a destructive enframing of the world.
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CHAPTER 4: INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES AND THE
ETHICAL RELATION
At the end of chapter one I discussed the affordances of ICTs on human relations
according to networked individualism. Drawing on various NI theorists, I suggested that
networked individualism understands the affordances of ICTs in terms of freedom and conflict.
To summarize briefly, NI theorists argue that ICTs enhance the ability of individuals to exercise
their freedom to create and manage their social worlds. This is so because ICTs allow skillful
networked individuals to communicate across distances, access and create larger networks, and
remain constantly connected. This freedom also creates more possibilities for conflict, however,
inasmuch as an individual’s unrestrained networking actions can (and often do) clash with
traditional norms of social etiquette. For NI theorists, the implications of these affordances are
understood in terms of inequality and renegotiation. The negative possibilities of freedom
(especially isolation) can be avoided with a certain amount of skill. Because of this, NI theorists
speak of the “network divide”—a form of inequality—as the primary obstacle to enjoying a
healthy social life. If everyone could acquire adequate ICTs and develop adequate “network
literacy,” then the negative possibilities of this enhanced freedom could be largely avoided. This
enhanced freedom does increase social conflict over questions regarding the acceptability of
certain social actions, but these conflicts will eventually recede as the accepted etiquette is
renegotiated and a new stasis is reached.
I argued in chapter one that understanding the affordances of ICTs in this way relies on
certain understandings of human beings and human relations in order to make logical sense.
Specifically, I first argued that NI theorists rely on the conceptualization of individuals as
autonomous and egocentric agents who are free to create and manage their social worlds (but not

47

free to choose the corresponding obligations). ICTs are seen as primarily enhancing individual
capacity to construct their own personal networks when human relations are already primarily
conceived in terms of personal autonomy. The theoretical starting points of NI theorists frames
pre-modern social life as autonomy undiscovered or suppressed, and modern technology as part
of a social liberation.
In the two subsequent chapters, I suggested that this view of social life is inadequate, and
I presented Levinas’s ethical phenomenology as a possible alternative. In contrast to the “weak
relationality” of networked individualism, Levinas argues for a “strong relationality” in which
human beings are not free to choose their relations, but rather, “are chosen.” Said differently, for
Levinas, the agency of human beings does not apply to creating ties, but in responding to the prereflective relations that constitute one’s subjectivity. In this chapter, I show that when we
consider the affordances of ICTs on human relations from a Levinasian perspective, we arrive at
altogether different conclusions.
A simple examination will begin to reveal the depth of the division between these two
perspectives. NI theorists argue that ICTs give networked individuals more autonomy and power
to create and manage their social relations. From a Levinasian standpoint, this possibility can be
seen as nonsensical because ultimately we are not free to create or destroy relations that
constitute our own subjectivity. My relation with the Other, experienced as an ethical
responsibility, exists before I can will it to exist. Therefore, understanding ICTs as enhancing an
autonomous and egocentric freedom that misunderstands itself to begin with furthers selfmisunderstanding and fails to highlight important dimensions of human relations. A Levinasian
perspective suggests a quite different understanding of the affordances of ICTs on human
relations. If ICTs are not understood primarily in terms of their capacity to increase my ability to
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create and manage interpersonal relations, what other kinds of affordances can a different
theoretical starting point enable us to see? This is the question I take up in this final section, but
which I do not claim to answer completely. This chapter should rather be understood as a starting
point for thinking about the affordances of technology on human relations from a Levinasian
perspective.
Availability
The affordances of ICTs on human relations seen from a Levinasian perspective will
include a similar attention to the freedom of the individual, but freedom here is understood as a
freedom to respond ethically rather than a freedom to make and manage relations. ICTs can be
said to alter the possibilities one’s the ethical response in two main ways: increasing one’s ability
to be available to the Other and increasing one’s ability to totalize the Other. These possibilities
combine to create a richly complex social world with both wonderful and terrifying possibilities.
In the first instance, ICTs can be seen to bridge gaps and increase ethical availability.
With ICTs, a person can be more readily available to receive the interrupting call of the Other in
need. This is especially true with mobile ICTs. This realization has led some Levinasian scholars
to argue that mediating technology is essentially neutral. Cohen (2010), for example, writes that:
“In our day, the ethical dimension of human proximity transpires across the communications
computers make possible, just as human proximity takes places across phone calls, letters, and
artifacts. The 'face' can be a letter. The 'face' can be an e-mail message. The computers themselves,
like alphabet letters and telephones, like pencils and books, however, are neither good nor evil. The
'face' ruptures them, pierces them with the alterity of the other. By themselves they are shadows of
shadows or masks of masks. For all these reasons, the issues raised regarding 'computer ethics' are at
bottom the issues of ethics simpliciter.” (p. 165)

Here Cohen reminds us that mediation does not fundamentally alter one's relation with
49

the Other. Obviously there is a difference between mediated relations that place distance and
abstraction between the ego and the Other and face-to-face relations, but Cohen's point here is
that ethical responsibility persists wherever one encounters the Other. E-mails, letters, and other
artefacts can always be traced back to an Other, and thus immediately create an ethical relation
with responsibility. No matter the medium, the inescapable experience of responsibility persists,
for where there is an encounter, there is ethical responsibility. Pinchevski (2014) similarly
reminds us that “[t]he saying persists through its reduction to the said while retaining something
of its unsayablity. The said must then contain, despite itself, its own prehistory—the residue of
the original saying” (p. 57).
According to Burggraeve (2007), one’s motivation for communicating across distances
thus becomes a crucial question:
Levinas does not ask “if” science and technology are responsible, but “how” or from what ethical
sensitivity they are applied: from self-interest, which looks out only for itself, or from a sense of justice,
which respects and promotes the Other as Other.” (p. 104)

Do I take up a mediated communication in order to bridge a distance between myself and
the Other, or do I take it up so I can do my business without being encumbered by the heightened
ethical sensitivity to the Other that I would feel when in his/her physical presence? Perhaps it is
true that people communicating through ICTs are more likely to refuse their ethical responsibility
to the Others that they encounter virtually, but the point that these authors are trying to make is
that distance does not deterministically cause individuals to refuse ethical responsibility.
Returning to the language of affordances, these authors assert that distance neither destroys
ethical responsibility nor makes ethical responses impossible.
Ethical Limitations of Mediated Communication
Recognition of the persistence of the ethical relation across mediation is an important
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starting point for understanding the affordances of ICTs on human relations from a Levinasian
perspective, but it is only the beginning. A thorough examination of affordances demands that we
also consider the ways in which ICTs constrain or create limits for human relations. Earlier I
showed that under networked individualism, the freedom to create and manage the social world
is limited by social obligations relating to the relations in question. Networked individuals are
free to make and break ties as they like, but they are not free to choose the requirements and
consequences of the relations they wish to keep. Alternatively, for Levinas, the affordances of
ICTs on human relations are limited by the capacity of mediated communication to meet the
needs of the Other in question. Even when taken up in a way that is true to ethical responsibility,
it would be a stretch to say that the ethical possibilities of mediated communications are equal to
the ethical possibilities of face-to-face interactions. To explore the ethical limitations of ICTs, I
introduce the distinction between interaction and communion.
ICTs can be powerful tools for the ethically-responsible self, especially when the ethical
response involves solving problems and making exchanges. Online, I can share relevant
information with someone who is facing a specific ailment or send money to someone across the
world. I can also use ICTs to coordinate in-person meetings with friends and family. When it
comes to the needs of the Other, however, visible problems that can be solved with actions or
exchanges often only reflect his/her most superficial needs. While ICTs might excel at
interaction, the greater need might actually be communion. An interaction, we might say, is any
communication between two or more individuals, be it verbal or non-verbal. When two or more
individuals communicate with one another in any way, it is an interaction. Social exchanges
theorists primarily study relations at the level of interactions, characterized by an exchange of
tangible or intangible content. This exchangeable content could be words, looks, money, or any
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number of limitless possibilities. Recall that the NI theorists discussed above evaluated ICT use
in terms of its impact on human interactions—they found that networked individuals have equal
or slightly more social interactions (including face-to-face interactions) than non ICT-users.
Unlike interaction, communion is more demanding. Communion (formed from the Latin
words com meaning “with” or “together” and unus, meaning “oneness,” or “union”) implies a
presence and a way-of-being, rather than a simple two-way communication. To experience
communion with another person is to experience something that the broad definition of
interaction fails to capture. Consider the verb to share. In the world of networked individualism,
sharing is most often the giving of some object from one individual to another (an interaction, or
exchange). With ICTs, networked individuals share links, images, words and all manner of
content with other individuals. In contrast, sharing can also refer to the experience of
communion. Such use of the word does not refer to a transferal of content, but of a “being with.”
This latter use is referred to in the phrase “sharing a moment,” or “sharing an experience.” If
sharing-as-transference is an intentional action, sharing-as-being-with is a particular way-ofbeing, characterized by a committed presence with another person.
Nouns and actions that we associate with communion contain this same sense of “being
with.” Take for example the word compassion, formed from the words com, meaning “with”, and
pati, meaning “to suffer,” which together express the idea of “suffering with.” Similarly, the
word companion is formed with the words com and panis, which literally means “with bread,” or
someone with whom one eats bread. These words express the idea of communion because they
refer to “being-with” another person in the passage of life.
An important question is to what extent communion is possible across distances through
technological mediation. Many authors have expressed their doubts. According to Dreyfus
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(2008), mediated communication is impoverished when it comes to sharing and receiving
emotions. Dreyfus argues that the rich communication and sharing of moods that provides people
with meaning and joy requires direct, embodied interaction that cannot be reproduced in most
forms of mediation. One notable exception might be video-chats. Even video-chats are limited,
however, in that the meaningful and important realm of physical touch is still out of reach.
Similar to the arguments made by Dreyfus, we can also question communication and
distance in terms of the saying and the said. As discussed above, the saying refers to the ethical
relation, while the said refers to the “whatness” of the communication. When in the physical
presence of the Other I receive a rich field of direct contact which do not have to be processed
into language. This is a said, but it is a said that is less constrained. In a way, I can feel and
empathize with the Other directly (this is Dreyfus’s point). When communicating with the Other
through e-mail, the fundamental ethical relation, the saying, remains unchanged, but the said is
now dramatically limited to include only written text. I am ethically responsible in either
scenario, but recall that my understanding of what I must do to be-for-the-Other stems from my
interpretation of the said, or on the things that the Other communicates to me through his/her
communication (be it verbal or non-verbal). When the said is limited to written text, my ability
to respond ethically in anything more than a superficial way is limited to the skillfulness and
clarity of the Other. It is not difficult to think of a scenario in which the Other may be have needs
that either cannot be adequately described through text or which the Other is not comfortable
divulging online, but which would be clearly manifest in the direct in-person encounter. What is
missed here is the ability to feel more directly the needs and sufferings of the Other while she is
“passively being [herself]” (Turkle 2012).
In sum, from a Levinasian perspective, mediated communication through ICTs limits my
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ability to meet the ethical demands of the Other who calls me. ICTs may excel at creating
interactions between myself and the Other, but distance and a lack of physical presence makes
meaningful experiences such as communion difficult or even impossible. While ICTs vary in
how much they afford ethical action, all ICTs share these constraints to a certain degree owing to
the mere facts of mediation and distance.
Distance and Totalization
The distance afforded by ICTs between myself and the Other not only limits my ability to
respond to the Other; it also more fundamentally alters the way I receive the Other’s call. As
several Levinasian scholars have argued, this increased distance is a cause for alarm. One of the
persistent ethical concerns relative to technology that arises out of a Levinasian perspective is the
question of mediated communication and encountering the ‘face’ of the Other. Miller (2012), for
example, argues that mediated communication presents a “crisis of presence,” wherein the full
impact of encountering the face of the other is diminished when physical distance is placed
between communicants. Following his argument, a significant reason for the increased violence
and carelessness that exists between people who communicate online, including cyberbullying
and incivility on comment pages, is anonymity and a lack of physical proximity. Introna (2002)
writes that “in the landscape of representation, of simulation, there are no faces only pictures—
pictures to be consumed according to our categories. In the (re)presentations, the images on the
screen, the voices of the other become faint and disappear. It is my contention that electronic
mediation distances us from the face of the other—we remain undisturbed in our self-certainty”
(p. 83). The central message here is that when layers of mediation are placed between
individuals, the uncontrollable, unavoidable, commanding Otherness of the Other does not have
the same interrupting impact. Simply put, it is easier for people to cause harm when they do not

54

have to confront the reality that their victims are particular faces with “proper names” (Introna
2002). Other technology authors present similar arguments (Flores and James 2013; Orgad 2007;
Silverstone 2004).
The problem of distance for ethics is artfully described in the Carol Reed (1949) film,
The Third Man. In the exchange below, Martins asks the antagonist Harry Lime how he feels
about being responsible for the deaths of dozens of people who died after being given watereddown doses of penicillin that Lime had been peddling. The two men converse in a ferris wheel
high above Vienna:
Martins: Have you ever seen any of your victims?
Harry Lime: You know, I never feel comfortable on these sort of things. Victims? Don't be
melodramatic. Look down there. Tell me. Would you really feel any pity if one of those dots stopped
moving forever? If I offered you twenty thousand pounds for every dot that stopped, would you
really, old man, tell me to keep my money, or would you calculate how many dots you could afford
to spare? Free of income tax, old man. Free of income tax - the only way you can save money
nowadays.

What stands out here is Lime’s insistence that the people in the city be referred to as
“dots.” By maintaining a careful distance between himself and the people who take his harmful
medications, Lime is able to maintain this illusion and avoid the discomfort of recognizing his
own responsibility for creating victims. According to Bauman (2001), this careful maintenance
of distance was a key component in the systematic execution of millions of Jews during World
War II. The mass genocide of the Holocaust, Bauman argues, was only possible because the
Nazis first created a great distance (physical and psychological) between Germans and the Jews.
Distance makes it easier to “efface” the face of the Other, meaning it makes it easier to totalize
the Other into an object that has no significance other than its immediate meaning imposed by
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the self. Where there is no present Other to cry out to me as an embodied being, there is less
awareness of ethical responsibility and recognition of the Other as other (Bauman 2001).
In recent times, authors writing from a Levinasian perspective have brought up various
examples which dramatically highlight the way in which the distance afforded by ICTs creates
problems for the ethical relation. Miller (2012), for example, discusses the phenomenon of “RIP
trolling,” in which individuals write offensive and/or unsettling comments on webpages that are
designed to be a reverent memorial of someone who has died. Miller also describes suicide chat
rooms, in which participants urge at-risk individuals to go through with their intentions to take
their own life and then watch via webcam when these individuals actually commit suicide.
Similarly, Introna (2002) recounts the story of Nick Leeson, whose unauthorized speculative
trading caused the collapse of Barings Bank and cost investors hundreds of millions of dollars.
Buffered by abstracted world of numbers, Leeson never had to directly face the people whom he
was hurting. These are extreme examples, but the impact of distance on the ethical encounter
also takes everyday forms. E-mail, for example, rarely causes the same impact and demand for
response as a knock on the door. Indeed, it is somehow easier to put off the Other that comes to
me through an ICT than the Other who is physically present.
All these examples suggest that there is a difference between encountering the Other in a
face-to-face relation and encountering the Other across a distance through mediating technology.
While it is true that I am responsible for the Other in both cases, it seems also true that mediated
relations afford this ethical responsibility differently than face-to-face encounters. Specifically,
the mediated encounter does not have the same interruptive force of the face-to-face encounter.
This difference afforded by distance makes it easier for a person to be violent or ignorant, or
alternatively, makes it more difficult to recognize one’s own ethical responsibility. This gap does
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not make ethical action impossible across distance, and in fact, as discussed above, ICTs can
increase ethical availability. Nonetheless, this gap does suggest that although ethical action is
possible through ICTs, it is less likely because the distant Other interrupts me with less urgency
than the Other who is physically present.
In addition to weakening the impact of encountering the Other, placing distance between
the self and the Other in ethical relations also affords the self with an illusion of control. I say
“illusion” here because Levinas would argue that the relation to the Other is precisely that which
resists control, which is always beyond one’s control. Social media sites that allow users to add
or remove friends with a click of a button suggest that the user is in control of friendships—an
affordance supported by networked individualism—but in Levinasian terms, relating to Others in
this way amounts to a denial of the relationality of one’s subjectivity. Because Levinas does not
take relations as objects that are separate from an autonomous subject, the ability to “control”
and “manage” human relations is better understood as an ability to deceive oneself. I may believe
that by “unfriending” someone I am terminating a relation, but for Levinas, ethical responsibility
persists—the relation cannot be disposed of so easily. Thus, inasmuch as ICTs allow for greater
distance between communicating individuals, they also increase the possibilities of violence and
self-deception. The degree to which individuals knowingly or unknowingly use distance to
justify violent actions is an empirical question, but it is clear that this violence can and does
occur.
Before moving on, it is worth noting that although everyone is exposed to the threat of
violence amplified by distance, it is likely that the most vulnerable person in a world of mediated
communication is the stranger. One of the distinguishing features of the Internet is that it has the
potential to bring together strangers from all over the world. In a single day, a person can come
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in contact with literally thousands of strangers via social media in its various forms. In network
theory there is much discussion of “consequential strangers,” meaning strangers who have
something useful to contribute to one’s personal network, but what about strangers who are not
“useful?” If another person does not belong to one’s network and is not directly capable of
influencing one’s network, they do not exist, at least not in a significant human way. NI theorists
themselves recognize this gap in their theory: “Private contact with familiar friends and
workmates is replacing public gregariousness so that people pass each other unsmiling on streets,
highways and hallways. Such privatization may be responsible for the lack of informal help
given to strangers in public spaces” (Wellman 2001, p. 43). Significantly, however, networked
individualism presents little hope for this situation. With an autonomous, egocentric model of
social life, “inconsequential” strangers essentially disappear. For Levinas, by contrast, the
stranger is someone for whom I am ethically responsible, with whom I am in an ethical relation.
This is true both online and offline. In this way, the relation with the stranger is always
consequential, inasmuch as it is part of my subjectivity. Awareness of this responsibility can and
is often obscured by the enframing orientation described above, but Levinas makes clear that
disregarding or harming the stranger amounts to a denial of one’s ethical subjectivity rather than
a failure to materialize a relation.
The Meaningfulness of Social Actions
In making these contrasts between the affordances of ICTs on human relations according
to networked individualism and Levinasian ethical phenomenology, I am not suggesting that NI
theorists are completely blind to the possibilities and limitations highlighted by the Levinasian
perspective. Regarding the limitations between mediated and face-to-face communication, for
example, Wellman (2001) writes, “Are online relationships as good as face-to-face relationships
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where people can see, hear, smell and touch someone, usually in a social context? Probably not.”
The difference, however, is that even if NI theorists recognize the same possibilities and
limitations, their theory gives no special importance to them when considering the affordances of
ICTs on human relations. For Levinas, on the other hand, these possibilities and limitations
inherently carry the utmost significance for humans as ethical, relational beings.
An example should help clarify this point. NI theorists proudly display their empirical
findings that networked individuals are not isolated and may actually spend more face-to-face
time with other people. In spite of this, their theory gives no special relevance to face-to-face
interactions. Following the assumptions of networked individualism, the desire to spend time
with one another in the same physical place is merely a matter of personal preference and social
norms, and the changing of these norms and preferences would not signal any significant loss.
They do recognize that conflicting ideas about ideal relations create social conflicts; consider, for
example, the following excerpt:
“As Toronto student Nazia Shahrin recounts, “I find my mother and father value face-to-face
communication a lot more than I do. To me, a phone call is good enough, while they really need to
see my face. It creates a lot of arguments where I am screaming, ‘I talk to you every day’ and they
are yelling, ‘But I haven’t seen you in two weeks.’” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 129)

Their interpretation of conflicts like this, however, is surprisingly hollow: “The norms of
networked individualism have not caught up to the practice of networked individualism” (p.
105). Of course, the inability to say anything more than a general observation of current trends is
the result of espousing a theory of human relations that begins with a foundation of a free,
autonomous self and that sees human relations as resources to be managed and used as
instrumental ends. With such a theory, whether preferences or social norms change or stay the
same makes no difference because it is ultimately up to the individual to decide what is of worth.
Of course, as Levinas shows, this way of thinking misses what makes interpersonal communion
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and embodied co-presence inherently meaningful and valuable. Ironically, then, with a
Levinasian perspective, ICTs can be said to impact human relations by increasing our awareness
of the importance of various ways of being-for-the-Other which are inherently limited by the
affordances of our devices. The desire to “be with” the Other, in this view is not merely the
manifestation of a social norm, but a desire that comes with acknowledging the reality of one’s
ethical responsibility.
The meaningfulness of social actions extends beyond the desire for embodied copresence. As always-on, always-connected mobile devices, ICTs have the capacity to be used in
virtually any time and place. This newfound ability raises all kinds of questions about how one
ought to use it in social life. NI theorists recognize these dilemmas and provide some good
examples:
“When, if ever, is it permissible to interrupt a conversation to accept a mobile call or a text
message? When, if ever, is it okay to check email on a mobile device while a meeting is taking
place? When, if ever, is it permissible to browse a social network site when a teacher is giving a
lecture? When, if ever, can you scream your dismay into the phone while you are waiting in line for
the bus?” (Rainie and Wellman 2012, p. 105)

The difference between their view of the problem and Levinas’s view, however, is that
they believe that the solution to the problem is simply a matter of “renegotiating norms,”
explaining that “the rebalancing of public and private means renegotiating the norms of absent
presence” (p. 105). In other words, following networked individualism, the conflicts and
questions described here do not point to any inherent deeper challenge to human relations.
Because human relations are simply believed to be what the self makes of them, the particular
question about using phones in the presence of Others does not have any significant meaning
outside of the fact that there exist corresponding norms which carry implications for the self. In
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the end, it makes little difference whether one chooses to enter into a private world in a public
place as long as the social conflict is removed and there are not negative consequences for
violating a norm. Once rebalance is achieved, the dilemma is over.
For Levinas, on the other hand, the question of how to use a device in the presence of the
Other is a fundamentally ethical question that demands a response that is mindful of the
particular embodied moment. Levinas is extremely suspicious of social norms, especially
regarding what is or is not ethical behavior, because he views the ethical as something that
emerges from a particular encounter with a particular Other. Any attempt to create a rationalized
list of what is or is not ethical (like Kantian ethics) must necessarily end in failure for Levinas
because ethics is situated in the intimate ethical relation. Furthermore, as someone who
witnessed the horrors and felt the pains of the Holocaust, Levinas is well-aware that what is
institutionalized as “right” and “ethical” can quickly become a justification for genocide. This is
the point that Bauman (2001), drawing on Levinas, so cogently makes in his own book.
At the same time, Levinas recognizes the importance of institutionalized norms and
social expectations. He recognizes that although institutional forces can never guarantee ethical
behavior, they are nonetheless important for their ability to sensitize or desensitize individuals to
their ethical responsibility. As such, fulfilling our ethical responsibility to all Others entails
constantly subjecting to critique the ideologies and patterns that are practiced and reinforced in
society. According to Roger Burggraeve, “Ethics must be the permanent purification of the
ideology lurking within every socio-political order, as it promotes itself as the sufficient and
definitive embodiment of economic, social, and political injustice… The ethical ideal of radical
selflessness ‘to and for the Other’ must put on trial every form of ideology present in a society,
whether manifest or hidden, thus holding open the way toward an always improving justice”
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(1985, p. 153-154).
This simultaneous distrust and reliance upon norms and institutionalized patterns
regarding the ethical use of ICTs in human relations presents a striking contrast to the overall
disinterestedness of networked individualism. Whereas networked individualism merely seeks
“balance” and “renegotiation” and does not care about the act in question, Levinasian ethics
demands constant ethical evaluation, rooted in the ethical relation the Other. Returning to the
question of how to respond when an ICT brings an individual into a simultaneous encounter of
multiple Others, NI theorists would say to simply follow the norms of mediated communication
as they change and develop, while Levinas would say to continuously bring those accepted
norms into question.
In terms of affordances, the inherent meaningfulness of particular social actions suggests
that the possibilities and limitations of ICTs for human relations go much deeper than what
networked individualism can account for. Whereas NI theorists see ICTs as enhancing an
individual’s freedom to make and manage the social world within the limitations of social norms
and expectations, a Levinasian perspective sees ICTs as raising new ethical questions which
reinforce the meaningfulness of certain social actions. Questions of distance, embodiment,
attentiveness and communion, while inherently meaningful for the individual in an ethical
relation, carry no inherent meaningfulness in networked individualism. Whereas NI theorists
imagine a world where individuals do not need to worry about these questions if they do not
want to and if they are not violating norms, a Levinasian phenomenology reminds us that as
ethical beings we will consider these implications by virtue of our responsibility for the Other.
Thus, whereas networked individualism sees the affordances of ICTs on human relations in terms
of freedom and conflict, ethical phenomenology reveals that ICTs highlight the limits of
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mediated communications. The accusation against networked individualism, then, is that its
relative indifference toward these limits risks reducing human relations to mere egoistic
exchange and perpetuating the destructive force of enframing.
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION
The way we theorize human relations has significant implications for the way we study
and interpret the impact of ICTs. In this thesis I have examined two theories of human
relations—networked individualism and relational phenomenology—and have compared their
claims about the social world as well as their implications for technology research. I hope that by
now the reader will see that studying the impact of ICTs on social life with an egocentric,
instrumental view of human relations is insufficient, inasmuch as it fails to consider the inherent
meaningfulness of many dimensions of human experience which are affected by ICTs. While
networked individualism is a useful approach in many ways, I suggest that a relational
framework such as Levinasian phenomenology is useful because it casts light on the areas that
remain hidden under networked individualism. With a Levinasian framework, we begin to see
that the possibilities and constraints of ICTs as discussed by networked individualism represent
only a fraction of the affordances of ICTs for human relations.
Following Heidegger, my aim is to enhance our understanding of technology and our
social life so that we can establish a free relation to our technology and open up new avenues for
social research. My fear is not that technology causes undesirable outcomes, but rather that we
might become blinded to the meaningful depths of human relations and use our technology in a
way that further contributes to this blindness. As I suggested above, ICTs can and are used for
many ethical ends that enrich human relations. However, there are limitations to what ICTs can
do in terms of human relations, and these limitations ought to be carefully considered. Failure to
do so risks desensitizing a society to the rich possibilities of social life.
While this thesis presented a broad, general look at the question of ICTs and human
relations, there are many possible implications for policy and future research. Education, for
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example, is an area which is becoming increasingly mediated by ICTs. Educators would benefit
from having a better understanding of how ICTs impact the lives of their students, in addition to
their academic achievement. Policies hoping to create not only more intelligent but also more
empathetic and socially aware citizens might think twice before uncritically embracing the
promises of new technology. Educators that choose to use ICTs in classrooms would benefit by
establishing and always improving rules and procedures that discourage egocentric, enframed
use.
Sociologists more generally would similarly benefit from having a deeper understanding
of human relations and ICTs. Qualitative researchers might use a Levinasian framework to
understand the ways in which individuals deal with questions of presence and distance in various
social settings, such as family, work, politics, or religion. When human relations are understood
as “relational all the way down,” we can begin to see the affordances of technology not merely in
terms of instruments for the self, but as objects that alter my subjectivity by changing my
encounter of the Other.
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Table 1. Three Accounts of Social Life

The Self
Relations

Freedom

Relation
Formation

Relation
Quality

Premodern Community
(according to NI
theorists)
The self is autonomous,
but autonomy has not
yet been “discovered”
Relations are ties which
stand apart from the
self (weak relationality)
The freedom to choose
relations and construct
the social world has not
yet been discovered
Individuals receive
relations that meet
some or all of their
needs (passive
instrumentalism)
The quality of human
relations is primarily a
question of skill
(obedience and loyalty)

Networked
Individualism

Levinasian
Relationalism

The self is autonomous

The self is relational

Relations are ties which Relations constitute
stand apart from the
the subjectivity of the
self (weak relationality) self (strong
relationality)
Individuals are free to
Individuals are free to
choose relations and
choose how to respond
construct the social
to their inescapable
world
ethical responsibility
Individuals seek
Individuals do not
relations out of selfchoose relations, but
interest (active
“are chosen” (radical
instrumentalism)
passivity)
The quality of human
relations is primarily a
question of skill
(networking literacy)
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The quality of human
relations is primarily a
question of one’s “way
of being”

